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Jason D. Runyan* and Ellen G. Steinke
Psychology Department, Indiana Wesleyan University, Marion, IN, USA
Virtues, broadly understood as stable and robust dispositions for certain responses
across morally relevant situations, have been a growing topic of interest in psychology. A
central topic of discussion has been whether studies showing that situations can strongly
influence our responses provide evidence against the existence of virtues (as a kind
of stable and robust disposition). In this review, we examine reasons for thinking that
the prevailing methods for examining situational influences are limited in their ability to
test dispositional stability and robustness; or, then, whether virtues exist. We make the
case that these limitations can be addressed by aggregating repeated, cross-situational
assessments of environmental, psychological and physiological variables within everyday
life—a form of assessment often called ecological momentary assessment (EMA, or
experience sampling). We, then, examine how advances in smartphone application (app)
technology, and their mass adoption, make these mobile devices an unprecedented
vehicle for EMA and, thus, the psychological study of virtue. We, additionally, examine
how smartphones might be used for virtue development by promoting changes in
thought and behavior within daily life; a technique often called ecological momentary
intervention (EMI). While EMA/I have become widely employed since the 1980s for
the purposes of understanding and promoting change amongst clinical populations,
few EMA/I studies have been devoted to understanding or promoting virtues within
non-clinical populations. Further, most EMA/I studies have relied on journaling, PDAs,
phone calls and/or text messaging systems. We explore how smartphone app
technology provides a means of making EMA a more robust psychological method,
EMI a more robust way of promoting positive change, and, as a result, opens up new
possibilities for studying and promoting virtues.
Keywords: experience sampling, mindfulness, self-awareness, habits, automaticity, character traits, virtues,
dispositions
Introduction
Over the past 15 years, virtues have received increased attention in the psychological
sciences. This has, in large part, been a result of the positive psychology movement
(Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Seligman et al., 2005). Positive psychology is
a subﬁeld of psychological science devoted to a deliberate attentiveness to human
ﬂourishing and its promotion. And virtues have been a central focus of positive
psychology (Seligman et al., 2005; Kristjánsson, 2013; Worthington et al., 2014).
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This increased attention to virtues, and positive psychology
in general, has not gone without criticism (e.g., Gable et al.,
2005; Held, 2005; Sundararajan, 2005; Kristjánsson, 2010, 2013;
McNulty and Fincham, 2012). In this review, our goal is not
to defend positive psychology. We, however, propose that there
is virtue in the psychological study of virtues. We, further,
propose that smartphone technology opens up a new means of
studying, and possibly promoting, virtue. In making our case, we
discuss:
• philosophical and psychological work concerning virtue
stability (persistence over time) and robustness (cross-
situational persistence);
• smartphone application (app) advances pertaining to the
measurement of human (and physiological) activity and
experience within daily life; and
• the use of mobile app technology for ecological momentary
assessment and intervention as it pertains to the study of
virtues.
Virtues and Situational Studies: Questions
of Stability and Robustness
Dating at least as far back as Aristotle’s analytic treatment of
virtues, there has been a long history of understanding virtues
as a kind of disposition (hexis). This Aristotelian conception is
often referred to as the traditional conception (cf. Timpe and
Boyd, 2014); and, following a marked decline in interest, virtues
understood along Aristotelian lines have received renewed
attention in moral philosophy. This renewed attention is in large
part a result of the inﬂuence of works by Anscombe (1958), Foot
(1978), and MacIntyre (1984).
According to a traditional Aristotelian conception, virtues
are human excellences understood as a subclass of psychological
disposition, or that is, ability to behave or think in certain ways,
or have certain psychological responses, across relevant situations
(Aristotle, 2000 I.13; Aristotle EE II.1218-20). Expressing virtues
is constitutive of a ﬂourishing (eudaimonic) life, or, that is, a
deeply fulﬁlling, well-lived life of growth (cf. Aristotle EE I.7-
II.1; Fowers, 2012). While a person can be virtuous without
ﬂourishing, and even while suﬀering, a person cannot ﬂourish
without being virtuous1. In the way a good ax cuts wood well,
a ﬂourishing person expresses virtues (Aristotle EE II.1213-34).
And virtues are expressed by actively doing or thinking certain
things, or by feeling certain emotions or having certain passive
responses (e.g., refraining from certain behavior), in morally
relevant situations (cf. Jayawickreme and Chemero, 2008).
Virtues, understood as a subclass of disposition, have been
recognized as having three important characteristics (Timpe and
Boyd, 2014). First, they are relatively stable. Virtues tend to
1It should be noted that the Aristotelian tradition is a eudaimonic tradition in
which happiness, or ﬂourishing, is analyzed in terms of living a fulﬁlled and deeply
satisfying life of growth through expressing virtues (Kenny, 2011, pp. xii–xiv). This
tradition is in opposition to hedonic traditions in which happiness is analyzed in
terms of aﬀect or subjective well-being (cf. Deci and Ryan, 2008a). At the same
time, accepting a eudaimonic analysis does not entail, or typically involve, thinking
it can never be the case that a person who is exercising virtues is not ﬂourishing; or
that a ﬂourishing life will not include subjective well-being or pleasure.
persist over some period of time. Thus, we generally cannot be
sure whether someone has a virtue until they have expressed
it on multiple occasions. Similarly, we generally cannot be sure
whether someone has a virtue until they have expressed it under
various virtue-relevant situations. And this relates to the second
characteristic of virtues. Virtues are relatively robust in the sense
that they are consistently expressed across a range of situations.
Third, virtues are interconnected in the sense that having one
virtue increases the probability of having others (cf. Watson,
1984; MacIntyre, 1999; Annas, 2011).
In modern psychology, Allport provided an early treatment
that supported the conception of virtues as a kind of relatively
stable, robust and interconnected disposition or trait (cf. Allport,
1960)2. However, more recently, a number ofmoral psychologists
have argued that there are good experimental grounds for
thinking virtues do not actually exist (cf. Nahmias, 2010). The
argument is that virtues are no more than unmaterialized ideals.
The grounds for this argument come from studies indicating
that, to a signiﬁcant degree, a person’s situation can inﬂuence
their conduct and thought without them being aware of it (Hunt,
1965; Mischel, 1968; Ross and Nisbett, 1991; Doris, 1998, 2002;
Harman, 1999). In one of the most well-known of these studies—
Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment—college students began
exhibiting guard-like or inmate-like behavior after only a few
days of taking on the role of either a guard or a prisoner in
a mock prison (Haney et al., 1973). In another well-known
experiment, Milgram (1963) found that a majority of participants
would administer what they thought to be a potentially lethal
shock to individuals they had never met if ordered to by an
experimenter as part of what was presented to them as a scientiﬁc
study (see also Hartshorne and May, 1928; Asch, 1951; Isen
and Levin, 1972). Additionally, over the past 20 years, a wealth
of studies have indicated that priming individuals by having
them, for example, read words with either prosocial or antisocial
connotations, or handle certain kinds of objects (e.g., smooth,
rough, heavy, hot, cold), can inﬂuence their subsequent behavior
and judgments without them realizing it (e.g., Williams and
Bargh, 2008; Ackerman et al., 2010; Bargh and Shalev, 2012).
2Two points should be made here: (1) First, Allport, and many psychologists
since, talk of traits (i.e., personality traits, character traits) rather than
psychological dispositions; and, while, “trait” and “disposition” are commonly used
interchangeably, traits are often thought of as a type of more stable disposition.
Having said this, there are variations in the use of the term “disposition.”
Sometimes, “disposition” and “trait” are both used to refer to any relatively stable
and robust psychological characteristic, including deﬁciencies or the lack of certain
psychological abilities (e.g., Eysenck and Eysenck, 1969; Watson and Clark, 1984;
McCrae and Costa, 2003). Other times, often in philosophical psychology, a
psychological disposition is understood as any psychological ability, some of which
are not, in and of themselves, typically understood as a trait or aspect thereof (e.g.,
Annas, 2011; Anjum et al., 2013; Hyman, 2014). For our purposes here, it is not
crucial to analyze various conceptions of psychological traits or dispositions, or
how these conceptions overlap. It suﬃces to point out that, often, there is overlap
in the use of “trait” and “disposition,” and, for our purposes here, a psychological
disposition is a psychological ability. A virtue is, then, a subclass of psychological
disposition or ability as outlined above (also see Mumford, 1998). (2) Second,
according to Allport (1960), the study of virtues involves value judgments and,
thus, is a study for moral philosophy rather than psychological science. As will
become clear, we take a diﬀerent view.
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The kinds of situational studies mentioned above have been
thought to provide evidence against the existence of virtues as
relatively stable and robust dispositions; that is, as dispositions
consistently expressed across relevant situations over a period
of time (Harman, 1999; Doris, 2002). However, while drawing
attention to the extent and ways situations can inﬂuence
individuals, to think these studies provide evidence against the
existence of virtues, conceived of as a type of stable and robust
disposition, is to infer too much. As Croom (2014) and others
(e.g., Alzola, 2008) have recently pointed out, thinking these
studies provide evidence against the existence of virtues results
from: oversimplifying an Aristotelian conception of virtues
as perfectly stable and robust dispositions; and/or drawing
unwarranted conclusions from these studies.
First, as Anscombe (1958, p. 14) has pointed out, regardless
of the virtues possessed by the average person, there may be a
complete set of virtues each of which is possessed by some people.
Virtues may be rare without being nonexistent; and, granted
they exist, they are likely rare. Thus, when studying whether
virtues exist, it is necessary to distinguish candidates for having
a certain stable and robust disposition from other individuals in
order to examine whether relevant situational inﬂuences have
similar eﬀects on both groups. So it is necessary to examine
exemplars (e.g., Colby and Damon, 1992, 1999; Dunlop and
Walker, 2013). Situational factors may not inﬂuence exemplars
in the way they do the average person. Exemplars may express
a virtue despite situational inﬂuences that make it diﬃcult to
do so. This, however, has not been tested in the situational
studies purported to call the existence of virtues in question. As
a result, the situational eﬀects observed in these studies should
not be generalized to the entire human population. Even if such
situational eﬀects are found in the majority, this does not provide
evidence that virtues do not exist.
Second—and in keeping with the above—the situational
studies purported to provide evidence that virtues are
nonexistent do not even provide evidence that virtues are
not possessed by a subgroup within the samples studied
(cf. Miller, 2013). Thus, at most, these studies indicate that
certain virtues are rare. For instance, in Darley and Batson’s
(1973) “Good Samaritan” study, only 10% of seminarians that
participated in the study helped someone who appeared to
need medical attention as they rushed to give a talk for which
they were very late. While these observations might be taken
to indicate that 90% of the seminarians lack a certain virtue, it
clearly should not be taken to indicate that all of them do.
Third, many of the studies thought to call into question
the existence of virtues have used undergraduate students who
may still be developing in ways relevant to the development
of virtues. It has been observed that the prefrontal cortex,
and its connectivity to other regions, typically continues to
develop up to late- or post-adolescence. This development is
inversely correlated with novelty seeking (e.g., Pfeﬀerbaum
et al., 1994; Reiss and Havercamp, 1996; Sowell et al., 1999,
2003; Gogtay et al., 2004; Kelley et al., 2004; Segalowitz and
Davies, 2004; Somerville et al., 2010, 2011) and impulsivity
(Shannon et al., 2011), which are, in turn, likely to be
inversely correlated with possessing stable and robust
psychological dispositions, including virtues. Thus, many
of these studies are performed using samples that tend
toward not having yet developed certain, stable psychological
dispositions.
Fourth, to provide evidence that virtues do not exist, it would
need to be shown that engaging in practices thought to contribute
to virtue development does not mitigate situational inﬂuences
on an individual’s responses. However, none of the situational
studies thought to bring the existence of virtues in question tests
this.
Fifth, a substantial amount of evidence indicates that cross-
situational consistencies in responses characteristic of relatively
stable and robust dispositions—such as virtues—are often
missed without the aggregation of repeated, cross-situational
measurements (Dlugokinski and Firestone, 1973, 1974; Staub,
1974; Epstein, 1979, 1983; Rushton, 1980, 1984; Rushton et al.,
1981, 1983; Fleeson, 2001; Furr, 2009). The reason is there are
multiple responses characteristic of these kinds of dispositions
and there is some degree of variability in their expression as a
result of interfering factors (Fleeson and Noftle, 2008; Miller,
2013). Thus, using one or two situational tests to examine
whether an individual possesses a disposition, or virtue, is
an insuﬃcient and unreliable approach to testing dispositional
stability and robustness.
In sum, situational studies thought to provide evidence against
the existence of virtues are not optimally designed to test whether
virtues exist, and, thus, should not be taken to indicate they do
not. There is, on the other hand, accumulating evidence that at
least some individuals do possess virtues.
First, studies that aggregate repeated, cross-situational
measurements of responses provide evidence that at least some
individuals express relatively stable and robust psychological
dispositions (Ozer, 1986; Fleeson, 2001, 2004; McNiel and
Fleeson, 2006; John et al., 2008; Donnellan and Lucas, 2009),
even if they are not impervious to situational inﬂuences (Fleeson,
2007; Fleeson and Noftle, 2008; Bleidorn, 2009). It is likely that
some of these dispositions contribute to psychological health and
growth and so, in keeping with a broadly conceived Aristotelian
tradition, are virtues.
Second, it has been observed that at least some psychological
states tend to ﬂuctuate around a “set point” (e.g., Suh et al.,
1996; Diener and Lucas, 1999; Diener et al., 2006; Keltner, 2009).
Since a psychological state can be the expression of a disposition,
this observation provides further evidence that relatively stable
and robust psychological dispositions exist. And, again, it is
likely that some of these dispositions contribute to psychological
health and growth; and so—again in keeping with an Aristotelian
tradition—are virtues.
Third, virtues can be possessed in degrees and the degree
to which a virtue is possessed can be used to predict patterns
of responses, such as the frequency of virtue-relevant responses
across relevant situations (cf. Miller, 2013). At the same time, as
with all dispositions, there are factors that can interfere with the
expression of virtues. Thus, some variability in virtue expression
across relevant situations is to be expected, and this variability
can be used to measure degree of virtue possession (Miller,
2013).
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Finally, as we will see in what follows, there is growing
psychological and neurophysiological evidence suggesting that
training can promote the development of relatively stable
and robust psychological dispositions which contribute to
ﬂourishing; or, that is, to virtue development understood along
Aristotelian lines.
In this review we make the case that advances in smartphone
technology open up a new approach to the psychological study
of relatively stable and robust dispositions. We also make the
case that putting this technology to use in this capacity promises
to add to mounting psychological and neurophysiological
evidence that certain individuals possess virtues understood
along Aristotelian lines. Having stated this, we should be
careful not to undervalue longstanding, everyday evidence
that, throughout history, certain individuals have consistently
expressed virtues in spite of strong situational inﬂuences to the
contrary (see Colby and Damon, 1992). For instance, steadfast
individuals who hid Jews in Nazi Germany, or undermined the
Nazi regime in other ways, have been well documented and
readily come to mind (e.g., see Marsh, 2014). We should, instead,
seek to learn from such exemplars. Further, we should be careful
not to undervalue the fact virtues have remained a useful, relevant
and commonplace construct for thousands of years.
Keeping the above in mind, we propose the integration of
something ancient and something cutting-edge: the study of
virtues and the use of smartphone app technology. We propose
that recent advancements in smartphone app technology, and
the mass adoption of this technology, opens up a new means of
examining and developing virtues through ecological momentary
assessment (EMA) and ecological momentary intervention
(EMI), respectively. In the remainder of this review, we,
ﬁrst, introduce EMA and discuss how smartphone technology
provides a vehicle for making EMA a robust psychological
method. We, second, examine how smartphone EMA studies
promise to add to our knowledge of virtues; and, in particular,
virtue stability and robustness. We, then, introduce EMI and
examine how smartphone technology provides a vehicle for
making EMI a widespread and eﬀective way of promoting
positive change. Finally, we discuss the promise smartphone EMI
holds as an eﬀective means of promoting virtue development.
EMA and Smartphone Apps
Quantitative psychological studies have, traditionally, relied
heavily on surveys and laboratory experiments. Both approaches
have well-known and long-endured limitations. Surveys require
people to make retrospective and often generalized judgments,
which tend to be aﬀected by memory limitations and recall biases
(cf. Schwarz, 2007). Laboratory experiments do not occur within
the context of a person’s daily life; and context can inﬂuence
a person’s states and responses (cf. Hammond et al., 1998;
Wilhelm et al., 2011), which raises questions about ecological
validity (Shiﬀman et al., 2008). Additionally, since neither
surveys nor laboratory experiments involve repeated, cross-
situational sampling, both approaches fail to detect intrasubject
variability within the context of an individual’s everyday life (cf.
Hammaker, 2012). This is particularly relevant with respect to
studying virtues since, as observed in the previous section, the
extent to which an individual’s states and responses vary across
situations—as well as individual diﬀerences in this regard—are
crucial to measure when examining virtue possession.
Though earlier analogs existed, ecological momentary
assessment (EMA, also referred to as experience sampling or
ambulatory assessment) developed in the 1980s as a way of
addressing the limitations of traditional quantitative methods
in psychological science (Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1987;
Stone and Shiﬀman, 1994; Shiﬀman et al., 2008). In particular,
it was developed as a form of assessment that allowed repeated
sampling within the various situations of daily life. In EMA,
individuals are prompted, at ﬁxed or random times, to respond
to questions about what they are presently doing and/or
experiencing (or what they have done and/or experienced in the
recent past), repeatedly, throughout a period of time within the
course of their daily aﬀairs. EMA has been implemented in a
number of ways, including through the use of stopwatches and
paper-and-pencil diaries, PDAs (personal digital assistants; e.g.,
PalmPilots), phone calls and text messages. However, progress
in smartphone technology has, recently, opened up a new mode
of EMA.
With the release of the iPhone OS2 operating system in
2008, smartphones that could run third-party applications, or
“apps,” began being used in the daily activities of millions of
people. By 2009, with the release of the iPhone OS3 operating
system, millions began carrying devices that could run multiple
apps continuously in the background; and some of these apps
could run without an internet connection. Today, a number
of companies make smartphones with this capability and
approximately 1.91 billion people carry these devices (eMarketer,
2015). It is projected that by 2018 this number will increase to
2.56 billion.
In more economically “developed” countries, the near
ubiquitous use of smartphone apps makes EMA practical for
widespread use. For the ﬁrst time, EMA can be conducted in a
robust and dynamic way by using a tool that is already a part
of daily life for a large percentage of the population (Raento
et al., 2009). The widespread use of smartphones opens up a
means of collecting psychological data within the moments of
daily life along with data collected through various types of
sensors (e.g., global positioning systems (GPS), microphones,
cameras, activity monitors, heart rate monitors). And, unlike
with other modes of EMA, participants need not be trained to
use a new device. Additionally, whereas using PDAs for EMA
requires a certain amount of programming expertise, ﬂexible
smartphone app-based EMA systems are being developed and
distributed that allow researchers to create their own EMA
designs through a user-friendly web interface that requires no
programming expertise (for a list see Conner, 2014; Konrath,
2015; also see Table 1)3. Further, smartphone app-based EMA
systems have been created that automatically enter data into
datasets as the data streams in from participants’ smartphones.
3Most smartphone app-based EMA systems work on either Apple or Android
devices, which make up the majority of smartphones in use. Only two work with
both: illumivu and LifeData.
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TABLE 1 | EMA peer-reviewed psychological studies using smartphone apps.
References Assessment target App Sensors Tailoring
Burns et al., 2011a Depressive symptoms Custom built x x
Palmier-Claus et al., 2012 Psychotic symptoms Custom built
Bossman et al., 2013 Affect and physical activity Movisens x
von Haaren et al., 2013 Affect and physical activity Movisens x
Walter et al., 2013 Mood and physical activity Movisens
Runyan et al., 2013 Time-management iHabit
Kirk et al., 2013 Illicit drug use eMOCHA
MacKerron and Mourato, 2013 Happiness Mappiness
Dunton et al., 2013b Affect and physical activity amongst children Custom built x
Watkins et al., 2014 Urges to smoke and location during attempts to quit
smoking
Custom built x
Khor et al., 2014 Coping, behavior and emotion problems amongst
adolescents with high-functioning autism
Mobiletype
Garcia-Palacios et al., 2014 Chronic pain in fibromyalgia Custom built
Adams et al., 2014 Stress SESAME
Randall et al., 2014 Emotion, regulation strategies and music listening MuPsych
Gonzalez and Dulin, 2015 Alcohol use disorders LBMI-A
Ottaviani et al., 2015 Mind-wandering and cognitive rigidity SurveyPocket and KoBo x
Bleidorn and Denissen, 2015 Virtues Movisens
These studies were located by searching Pubmed.com, and publications from peer-reviewed psychology journals listed in Scholar.google.com, up to February 27th, 2015 (search terms:
“ecological momentary assessment” and “smartphone”).
aIn the Burns et al. (2011) study, depressive symptoms were assessed in order to predict mood for the purposes of tailoring when coping strategies were delivered. Thus, this was an
EMA/I study.
bDunton et al. (2013) used custom software downloaded onto a mobile phone rather than a standard smartphone app.
This increases the practicality of handling the relatively large
amounts of data collected in EMA studies, which can easily
approach ten thousand items of data.
In addition to making EMA more practical for widespread
use, smartphone app-based EMA systems have been designed to
ensure that participants respond to questions “in the moment,”
or, that is, soon after being alerted to do so. Some systems
time stamp responses so that the time lapse between when a
person is notiﬁed to answer a question and when they answer
it can be calculated. Some systems also allow researchers to
give participants a limited time window to respond to questions
after being notiﬁed. These features help ensure that individuals
are not merely giving a convenience sampling, which has
been an issue with other modes of EMA (e.g., Stone et al.,
2002).
As shown in Table 1, since 2011, there have been a number
of psychological EMA studies conducted using smartphone apps.
Several of these involved acquiring data through environmental,
activity and/or physiological sensors together with self-report.
One has involved tailoring assessments to the individual, and
their moment-to-moment experiences, in response to their
location and activity level.
To date, most app-based EMA studies have been conducted
on clinical populations and many have been pilot studies. There
have, however, been a number of non app-based EMA studies
that have examined momentary dispositional expressions (see
Table 2). To our knowledge, only one EMA study (published after
this manuscript was under review) has systematically focused
on assessing virtues using momentary responses (see Bleidorn
and Denissen, 2015). Nevertheless, EMA provides a means of
repeatedly measuring an individual’s states, experiences and
responses, as well as the extent to which these vary, using
multiple measures throughout the moments and situations of
everyday life. And, as we saw in the previous section, repeated,
cross-situational sampling using an aggregate of measures is
crucial for the psychological study of virtues; and, in particular,
for testing dispositional stability and robustness. Further, as
Wichers (2014) has recently observed, measuring moment-
to-moment states and events can provide insight concerning
patterns contributing to the development of enduring unhealthy
or healthy mental conditions. Thus, app-based EMA—as a
means of measuring moment-to-moment states and events—
provides an unprecedented vehicle for studying dispositions,
including those that contribute to psychological well-being; i.e.,
virtues.
Virtues and App-Based EMA
Traditionally, in Western thought, wisdom, justice, temperance,
and courage have been thought of as “cardinal” (derived from
the Latin “cardo” meaning hinge), or principal, virtues (e.g.,
Wisdom of Solomon 8:7; Plato, 380 BC/1991; Ambrose et al., (377
AD/1961)). Aristotle, however, inﬂuentially extended this list and
understood virtues to be optimal points between deﬁciencies
and excesses (cf. Aristotle EE; see Table 3). Additionally, within
Christian theology, faith, hope, and love (or charity) have
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TABLE 2 | EMA peer-reviewed psychological studies targeting momentary dispositional expression within non-clinical populations.
Study Target EMA mode
Marco and Suls, 1993 Neuroticism Paper and pencil
Stone et al., 1998; Schwartz et al., 1999; Roesch et al., 2010 Coping PDA, PDA, Internet daily diary, respectively
Räikkönen et al., 1999; Vella et al., 2012; Demarble et al.,
2014
Hostility PDA and Monitoring devices for ECG and blood
pressure
D’Antono et al., 2001 Agreeableness Paper and pencil
Brown and Ryan, 2003; Levesque and Brown, 2007 Mindfulness Paper and pencil
Conner and Barrett, 2005 Implicit self-attitudes and negative feeling states PDA
Kane et al., 2007 Working memory capacity and mind-wandering PDA
Moberly and Watkins, 2008; Huffziger et al., 2013 Ruminative self-focus Paper and pencil, PDA, respectively
Conway et al., 2009 Empathy, altruism, helping behavior and affect PDA
Burt and Donnellan, 2010 Antisocial behavior and acting-out PDA
Minbashian et al., 2010 Conscientiousness PDA
Fay and Sonnentag, 2012 Trait affect and proactive behavior PDA
Bruehl et al., 2012 Anger and chronic pain intensity PDA
Schwerdtfeger and Scheel, 2012 Self-esteem and cardiac vagal tone PDA; Monitoring devices for ECG and bodily
movement
Hofmann et al., 2012; Lopez et al., 2014 Self-control PDA
Edmondson et al., 2013 Anxiety and anger PDA
Silvia et al., 2014 Creativity Cell phone delivered surveys
aan het Rot et al., 2015 Impulsivity, quarrelsomeness and agreeableness Paper and pencil
These studies were located by searching Pubmed.com, and publications from peer-reviewed journals listed in Scholar.google.com, up to February 27th, 2015 (search terms: “ecological
momentary assessment” and “virtue,” or “trait,” or “disposition”). Only studies targeting momentary dispositional expressions in non-clinical populations are included.
TABLE 3 | Aristotle’s list of virtues.
Virtue (Mean) Deficiency Excess
Courage Cowardice Foolhardiness
Temperance Insensibility Intemperance
Liberality (Generosity in small matters) Illiberality Prodigality
Magnificence (Generosity in large matters) Shabbiness Extravagance
Self-worth Diffidence Vanity
Dignity Servility Churlishness
Gentleness Impassivity Irascibility
Candor Dissembling Boastfulness
Justice Loss Gain
Friendliness Surliness Flattery
Modesty Shamelessness Shyness
Righteous indignation Malicious enjoyment Envy
Wisdom Naivety Cunning
Hardiness Softness Toughness
Aristotle understood virtues to be means between the vices of excess and deficiency.
This table lists Aristotle’s virtues along with their corresponding excess and deficiency
(adapted from Kenny’s (2011) translation of Eudemian Ethics; note: Aristotle develops a
slightly different list in the Nicomachean Ethics).
traditionally been upheld as key “theological virtues” (e.g., 1
Corinthians 13:13; Aquinas, 1274/1948).
Recently, the case has been made that six “overarching”
characteristics are widely upheld as virtues across most cultures
(Peterson and Seligman, 2004; Dahlsgaard et al., 2005; Seligman
et al., 2005; but see Shryack et al., 2010). These are: wisdom,
TABLE 4 | Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) “Virtues in Action”
classification of virtues.
Wisdom Creativity, Curiosity, Open-mindedness, Love of learning,
Perspective
Courage Authenticity, Bravery, Persistence, Zest
Humanity Kindness, Love, Social intelligence
Justice Fairness, Leadership, Teamwork
Temperance Forgiveness, Modesty, Prudence, Self-regulation
Transcendence Gratitude, Hope, Humor, Religiousness
This table has been adapted from Seligman et al. (2005), which contains a description of
the various virtue subtypes.
courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence (see
Table 4). And there has been some indication that rankings of
these characteristics strongly correlate across many countries
(n = 54) and, to some extent, transcend ethnic, cultural and
religious diﬀerences (Park et al., 2006; but see van Oudenhoven
et al., 2012).
However, rather than understanding virtues as a prescribed set
of characteristics, following the broadly conceived Aristotelian
conception we outlined earlier, we understand virtues to be a
kind of relatively stable and robust psychological disposition
the expression of which contributes to a fulﬁlling, well-lived
life of growth; or, that is, to a ﬂourishing life. Whatever
else a fully ﬂourishing life may involve, such a life involves
psychological growth, psychological (eudaimonic) well-being and
physical health (cf. Ryan and Deci, 2001; Keyes, 2007; Ryﬀ
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and Singer, 2008; Deci and Ryan, 2008a)4. In this case, since
psychological growth, psychological well-being and physical
health are measurable, which dispositions contribute to a
ﬂourishing life, and, thus, should be included in a list of virtues,
can be empirically studied. What should be considered a virtue
is also an important matter since a ﬂourishing life is obviously
desirable. That being said, it should be kept in mind that
dispositions which contribute to a ﬂourishing life may lead
to ﬂourishing under a certain range of circumstances without
leading to ﬂourishing under all circumstances. For instance,
certain characteristics may contribute to ﬂourishing only when
possessed by a critical number of individuals within a social
group. Further, characteristics may contribute to ﬂourishing
when possessed in clusters but not on their own. Thus, under
certain circumstances, an individual may suﬀer despite, and even
as a result of, expressing virtue. Likewise, an individual may not
experience physical health despite expressing virtue.
Over the past several years, ﬂourishing has received increased
attention in psychological science, and a number of studies
have identiﬁed psychological characteristics that correlate with
psychological growth, psychological well-being and/or physical
health. Dispositional resilience has been positively correlated
with successful adaptation to life stress (Ong et al., 2006)
and with the well-being of widows (O’Rourke, 2004; Rossi
et al., 2007). Additionally, dispositional mindfulness has been
positively associated with both psychological well-being and
physical health (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2011; Baer et al., 2012;
Bowlin and Baer, 2012; Tamagawa et al., 2013); and individual
diﬀerences in dispositional mindfulness predict psychological
health (e.g., Baer, 2003; Baer et al., 2004). Other dispositions
positively associated with psychological and/or physical health,
include gratitude (e.g., Wood et al., 2010; Emmons and Mishra,
2011), optimism (e.g., Scheier and Carver, 1987; Scheier et al.,
1989, 2001; Engberg et al., 2013; Carver and Scheier, 2014;
He et al., 2014), self-eﬃcacy (e.g., Bandura, 2004; Luszczynska
et al., 2005), compassion (e.g., MacBeth and Gumley, 2012),
altruism (e.g., Brown et al., 2009), self-regulation (e.g., Nix et al.,
1999; Wrosch et al., 2003; Deci and Ryan, 2008b; Simon and
Durand-Bush, 2014), forgiving (e.g., Berry and Worthington,
2001; Farrow et al., 2001; Maltby and Day, 2001; Seybold andHill,
2001; Lawler-Row, 2010), spirituality (e.g., Hill and Pargament,
2003; Miller and Thoresen, 2003; Kuo et al., 2014; Reutter and
Bigatti, 2014), religiosity (e.g., Hummer et al., 1999; McCullough
et al., 2000; Oman and Thoresen, 2005; Greenﬁeld and Marks,
2007; Park, 2007), and wisdom (e.g., Webster and Deng, 2014).
Most of the studies associating dispositions with ﬂourishing—
including those mentioned above—rely on surveys to measure
the disposition in question. They examine associations between
the possession of these dispositions and some measure, or
correlate, of ﬂourishing. This approach, however, is not ideal for
measuring, or then studying, dispositions for several reasons.
First, surveys assessing dispositions do not involve measuring
the expression of dispositions within the context of an individual’s
daily life; or allow directly associating this expression with
4Psychological well-being is not to be confused with subjective well-being (for e.g.
see Ryﬀ and Singer, 2008; Ryﬀ, 2013). See note 1.
ﬂourishing. Rather, as we noted at the beginning of the previous
section, surveys ask for generalized retrospective judgments
removed from a person’s daily context, which are susceptible to
recall biases.
Second, as they do not involve repeated, cross-situational
sampling, surveys assessing dispositions cannot eﬀectively
measure intrasubject variability in the expression of a disposition.
As a result, this approach does not provide an eﬀective means of
measuring dispositional stability or robustness, which, as we have
already seen, is paramount to the psychology study of virtues.
In contrast, EMA allows: (1) the detection of dispositional
expression, and its correlates, within the context of daily life using
multiple measures; and (2) the measurement of dispositional
stability and robustness through repeated cross-situational
sampling. EMA, thus, provides (3) a more thorough and direct
means of examining the relationship between dispositions and
ﬂourishing than traditional approaches that rely on surveys. We
will discuss points (1)–(3) in sequential order.
(1) Through the incorporation of environmental, activity, and
physiological sensors, app-based EMA opens up various ways of
detecting:
(i) the expression of virtues;
(ii) correlates of having or expressing these dispositions; and
(iii) the relevant features of the situations in which they are
expressed.
Virtues can be expressed by psychological states (e.g., emotional
states, motivational states) as well as by what people think and
do (e.g., Bartlett and DeSteno, 2006; DeSteno et al., 2010). Thus,
EMA can be used to detect virtue expression by asking people
questions pertaining to their recent or current psychological
states, experiences, thought life and/or behavior (for e.g., see
studies listed in Table 2) as well as by administering brief
psychological tests (cf. Schlicht et al., 2013). An EMA app can
prompt individuals to respond to questions, or take brief tests,
repeatedly at various moments, and across various situations,
throughout the day. As a result, rather than asking people tomake
generalized retrospective judgments (e.g., “In the past month,
I have. . . ”), an individual can be asked about their current or
recent states, experiences or conduct (e.g., “Over the past hour,
I have. . . ”). And survey-style instruments assessing virtues might
be adapted so that, rather than asking for generalized judgments,
they ask for reports concerning the present or recent past (cf.
Fleeson, 2001).
For example, Hofmann et al. (2014) recently used EMA to
repeatedly prompt people at random times over a 3-day period
to report moral and immoral behavior over the previous hour.
This allowed for the detection of patterns in moral behavior (e.g.,
social contagion, moral licensing) and awareness (e.g., a relative
tendency to note others’ immoral rather than moral behavior).
More recently, Bleidorn and Denissen (2015) took adjectives
associated with, and listed in, Peterson and Seligman’s (2004)
six Virtues in Action classiﬁcations (see Table 4) that could be
meaningfully inserted into the following sentence: “I behaved
particularly. . . during the last hour.” They, then, used app-based
EMA to deliver these sentences to participants up to six times a
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day over a 10-day period in order to have them rate their behavior
in the past hour. Amongst their participants—working mothers
and fathers—they found that an individual’s average virtue rating,
the degree of variability in their rating, and the way an individual
typically responded in certain contexts were relatively stable.
In addition to delivering questions, smartphones can be
used to randomly capture conversations or other activities (e.g.,
Mehl et al., 2012). Further, prompts can be given immediately
after these recordings asking individuals to report their states,
experiences or thoughts; and/or asking them to upload a picture
or video of their surroundings. This allows the association of life
events and situations with momentary states, experiences and/or
responses that would, otherwise, be forgotten once individuals
are more temporally and spatially removed from the event or
situation. It also allows the capture of contextual details that an
individual would, otherwise, be unaware of or forget.
Activity sensors (e.g., Fitbit, Polo tech, Apple Watch;
Moviesens) can also be used to record any physical and
physiological activities correlated with an individual’s
momentary responses, states and/or experiences (e.g., D’Antono
et al., 2001; Schwerdtfeger and Scheel, 2012; Bossman et al., 2013;
von Haaren et al., 2013; Demarble et al., 2014; Dunton et al.,
2014). Participants might, further, be prompted to take saliva
samples in order to examine potential biochemical correlates
(e.g., cortisol, oxytocin or progesterone levels) of dispositional
expression (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Entringer et al., 2011;
Koven and Max, 2014). Or they might take a pharmacological
agent (e.g., tryptophan, an anti-anxiolytic, an anti-depressant)
while participating in an EMA study targeting dispositional
expression (cf. Moskowitz et al., 2001; Moskowitz and Young,
2006).
In the near future, app-based EMAwill also allow the isolation
of neurophysiological correlates of having and/or expressing
certain dispositions within certain situations. For example,
mobile electroencephalography (EEG) caps (e.g., Eegosports)
could be synced with an EMA app in order to record event-
related potentials, or preparatory neural activities such as
readiness-potentials (RPs); i.e., relative changes in the activity of
the primary motor cortex and surrounding regions associated
with preparedness to act (e.g., Freude and Ullsperger, 1987; Coles
et al., 1988; Coles, 1989; Deecke et al., 1990; Shibasaki andHallett,
2006; Ibanez et al., 2012; Nachev and Hacker, 2014). Through
these means we might ﬁnd that, when an individual has a certain
disposition, certain preparatory activities occur under certain
situations. Similarly, app-based EMA that incorporates mobile
EEG might allow the detection of other neurophysiological
correlates of expressing dispositions similar to those recently
measured for forgiving using fMRI, where an increase in activity
in the angular gyrus was associated with forgiving (see Figure 1).
(2) By allowing various ways of detecting (i)–(iii)—listed
above—smartphone app-based EMA provides a vehicle for
more direct and repeated measurement of disposition-relevant
responses across various daily situations using an aggregate
of measures. It, thus, provides a means of collecting cross-
situational data to populate a frequency distribution of an
individual’s disposition-relevant responses organized by the
degree to which each expresses the disposition in question. From
FIGURE 1 | Neural differences between forgiving and not forgiving as
measured by fMRI. The red shows where increased activity was observed
when participants forgave in comparison to when they did not (taken from
Strang et al., 2014). AG, angular gyrus; R, right; L, left.
this distribution, a mean score for an individual’s dispositional
expression and the variability of this expression can be calculated
(Fleeson and Noftle, 2008). In this way, EMA provides a way
of measuring the typical degree to which, and consistency with
which, an individual expresses a disposition throughout the
relevant situations of their daily life over a period of time.
So it provides a means of directly measuring the stability and
robustness of a disposition, or virtue. In so doing, it provides a
way for assessing not simply whether an individual has a virtue
but the degree to which they have a virtue.
We should expect individuals who possess a certain virtue
to typically express that virtue across a certain range of
situations (Jayawickreme and Chemero, 2008). That is, given an
Aristotelian conception, we should expect a virtue to be, to a
certain degree, stable and robust. However, similar to the way
the expression of other relatively stable and robust dispositions
have been observed to vary (Ozer, 1986; McNiel and Fleeson,
2006; John et al., 2008; Donnellan and Lucas, 2009), some
variability in the expression of a virtue should also be expected
(see Miller, 2013). Nevertheless, the stronger, or more formed,
a virtue, the more consistency there will be in its expression
across relevant situations. This is because the stronger a virtue,
the more frequently it is expressed in demanding situations, and
despite interfering factors (Miller, 2013). So, after repeated cross-
situational sampling of virtue-relevant responses, the degree to
which an individual has a virtue can be measured as a function of
the individual’s mean score for its expression and the variability
with which they express the virtue across relevant situations (cf.
Fleeson, 2001; see Figure 2).
Thus, to recapitulate, EMA provides a way of repeatedly
measuring virtue-relevant responses across various situations.
This allows the measurement of the degree to which a person has
a virtue along two dimensions: the degree to which they typically
express the virtue and the consistency with which they express the
virtue. These observations are in keeping with observations made
concerning distributions of responses relevant to the expression
of dispositions more generally (e.g., Mischel, 1968; Epstein, 1979,
1983; Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson and Noftle, 2008).
(3) As observed above, EMA provides a means of repeatedly
and more directly assessing dispositional expression across an
individual’s daily situations. It, thus, provides a vehicle for not
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FIGURE 2 | Illustrative frequency distributions of momentary,
cross-situational dispositional expressions displaying differences in
degree of virtue possession. (A) The red curve displays a distribution
representing a higher typical degree of virtue expression (higher mean score)
than the blue curve. (B) The red curve represents a higher typical degree of
(higher mean score), and more consistent (less variable), virtue expression than
the blue curve.
only assessing whether an individual has a virtue, but also the
degree to which they typically express a virtue and the consistency
with which they express a virtue. And since the degree to which
an individual typically expresses a virtue and the consistency with
which they express the virtue have implications for ﬂourishing,
EMA provides a thorough means of examining the relationship
between virtues and ﬂourishing.
To illustrate, EMA opens up a way of measuring the degree
to which an individual is typically grateful and the consistency
with which an individual is grateful. And both should be
expected to promote ﬂourishing given gratitude is a virtue.
Thus, by allowing a direct assessment of both, EMA provides
a thorough and direct means of examining the relationship
between dispositional gratitude and ﬂourishing. Further, since
EMA allows the detection of dispositional expression within
daily life, it also provides a good means of examining what
may mediate relationships between dispositions, like gratitude,
and ﬂourishing as well as the interconnectedness of virtues
(e.g., whether developing dispositional gratitude might directly
correlate with developing others).
Before continuing we should mention that there are
several limitations associated with EMA. Asking participants to
repeatedly respond to prompts and questions over time, and
within daily life, places a high demand on participants thereby
increasing the likelihood of participant dropout and decreasing
response rates (e.g., Shiﬀman et al., 2008). To compensate,
participants need greater incentive than with traditional surveys.
Also, there are issues regarding the invasion of privacy, which
must be carefully addressed (Trull, 2015). Further, under certain
conditions, EMA has been shown to result in reactivity (cf.
Shiﬀman et al., 2008).
Having examined the advantages and limitations of using
EMA—and speciﬁcally app-based EMA—to study virtues, we will
now examine recent developments in EMI and the possibilities
they open up for promoting dispositional development.
EMI, Positive Change, and Smartphone
Apps
Clinicians and therapists have often sought ways to improve
the impact of therapy between sessions and the eﬃcacy of
interventions (Heron and Smyth, 2010). With this aim, over
the past several years, researchers have been exploring the
use of mobile devices to intervene and interact with clients
within the context and moments of their daily life. This
form of intervention, called ecological momentary intervention
(EMI), has—similar to EMA—been implemented using PDAs,
phone calls, text messages and, most recently, smartphone apps.
EMI has developed largely as an extension of interventions
involving computer- and internet-based cognitive-behavioral
therapy (CBT; e.g., Butler et al., 2006; Andersson and Cuijper,
2009; Moore et al., 2011; Spence et al., 2011).
Self-monitoring has long been known to, under certain
conditions, raise self-awareness and promote positive behavioral
development (e.g., Harris and Lahey, 1982; Korotitsch and
Nelson-Gray, 1999; Shapiro and Cole, 1999; Shiﬀman et al., 2008;
Cohen et al., 2013; Maas et al., 2013). Speciﬁcally, it has been
theorized that being asked questions about one’s momentary
states, experiences, behaviors and/or thoughts close to the time
and context of their occurrence may help one become more
mindful of their occurrence thereby providing opportunity for
change (cf. Goodwin et al., 2008)5. Recent evidence suggests that
EMI may be particularly eﬀective for self-monitoring and raising
self-awareness (Robinson et al., 2013; Runyan et al., 2013). For
instance, in a recent study, our lab used an EMA/I app (iHabit) to
ask undergraduate freshman how they were spending their time
at various points throughout the day for three separate weeks
during a semester (Runyan et al., 2013). Compared to controls,
at the end of the study freshman using the app reported wasting
nearly twice as much time throughout the semester. Further,
amongst those using the app—but not amongst controls—this
self-report predicted semester GPA comparable to the best single
predictors of ﬁrst semester GPA (i.e., high-school GPA and
5It should be noted that it has also been theorized that simply being aware of
being observed, or of having one’s behavior assessed, eﬀects one’s behavior—a
phenomenon known as the Hawthorne eﬀect (Solomon, 1949; Sommer, 1968;
Parsons, 1974; Wickstrom and Bendix, 2000). However, recently, mixed evidence
for the Hawthorne eﬀect has lead to serious questions about the adequacy of this
construct. Rather than there being a Hawthorne eﬀect, evidence indicates that
multiple conditions lead to various eﬀects when one is aware of being assessed or
of having one’s behavior assessed (see Gale, 2004; McCambridge et al., 2014). Here,
we focus on one such condition: increased self-awareness.
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ACT score). The implication is that using the app promoted
self-awareness concerning time-management.
In addition to prompting self-monitoring, EMIs have been
used to:
• motivate (Rodgers et al., 2005; Franklin et al., 2006);
• encourage engagement in practices or the use of previously
learned skills (e.g., DBT coach, Rizvi et al., 2011);
• aid in the development of new skills (Villani et al., 2012; Bless
et al., 2014);
• notify (Dulin et al., 2014) or distract (Rodgers et al., 2005)
individuals when they are at risk of engaging in addictive
behavior; and
• provide individuals with personalized summary data (Hurling
et al., 2007; Bless et al., 2014).
Though most EMI studies using smartphone apps are in
developmental stages (e.g., Pramana et al., 2014; Wenze et al.,
2014), there is some initial evidence from a number of health,
clinical, and therapeutic domains that, in certain forms, EMImay
promote positive dispositional development (e.g., Heron and
Smyth, 2010; Cohn et al., 2011; Donker et al., 2013; see Table 5).
For example, in a smoking cessation study, text messages
were sent to participants about health practices. Participants
were also sent motivational stories or distraction topics (sports,
travel, general interest, etc.) during times they were likely
to smoke (Rodgers et al., 2005). Nearly 1000 messages were
designed for this study and were sent to individual participants
based on factors such as smoking history and preferences. The
intervention was largely successful. In comparison to controls,
twice as many people in the EMI group reported that they had
quit smoking after 6 weeks.
In another recent EMI study, participants performed a
cognitive task to improve auditory attention on an iPod touch
twice a day for 3 weeks (Bless et al., 2014). This experimental
group, unlike the control group, showed improved auditory
attention and evidence of functional neural plasticity in regions
associated with auditory processing (left posterior temporal
gyrus) and executive function (right middle frontal gyrus) during
an auditory attention task asmeasured using fMRI (see Figure 3).
As we noted earlier, an important part of the psychological
study of virtue is the examination of whether stable and robust
dispositions can be developed. And thoughmost app-based EMIs
are in various exploratory stages, as we will discuss next, they hold
promise for incorporating interventions that promote positive
dispositional development into the daily activities of a large non-
clinical, non-therapeutic population. In initial studies, eﬀects
during and immediately following EMI have been documented
more than long-term eﬀects (see Table 5). However, smartphone
app-based systems that couple EMA and EMI provide an
unprecedented means of testing whether EMI can help promote
dispositional, including virtue, development.
Virtues and App-Based EMI
Little is directly known about the eﬃcacy of EMI approaches
to virtue development. In this section we, thus, discuss reasons
for thinking such approaches have promise. In particular, we
point out how app-based EMI oﬀers a versatile, multifaceted
and interactive way of promoting training, mindfulness, self-
awareness, motivation and environmental awareness within the
context of everyday life. We, then, outline parameters that may
inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of EMI and an approach to optimizing
EMIs for virtue development.
In addition to being practical due to the widespread use of
smartphones, app-based EMI may be a particularly eﬃcacious
approach to promoting virtue development since it provides a
versatile and multifaceted means of interacting with individual’s
within their everyday context. Developing a disposition, such as a
virtue, is a learning process through which a behavior or response
becomes a stable and robust habitual response or automatic
FIGURE 3 | Neural differences between those trained in an auditory
attention task and controls as measured by fMRI. Brain regions
displaying significant decreases at points during a selective auditory attention
task amongst trained participants (taken and adapted from Bless et al.,
2014). Z, horizontal plane coordinate; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus; FG,
fusiform gyrus; PG, precentral gyrus; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; red,
forced-left response conditions; blue, forced-right response conditions;
purple, overlap.
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response (e.g., Wood and Neal, 2007; Gawronski and Cesario,
2013). Learning context is important for this process.
There has been extensive animal research on the importance
of learning context for response learning. First, animal studies
reveal that learning contexts can function as “occasion-setters”
such that, while they do not elicit a learned response themselves,
they inﬂuence an animal’s learned response to another stimulus
thereby “setting the occasion” for this response (cf. Schmajuk
and Holland, 1998; Bouton, 2010). Second, after learning a new
response, animals often revert back to previous responses within
contexts that vary from the context in which the new response
was learned (cf. Bouton and Bolles, 1979; Peck and Bouton, 1990).
Third, animals can be conditioned in one context (context A)
and counterconditioned—or conditioned to give an opposing
response—in another (context B), and continue to show the
initial, conditioned response in context A and the opposing,
counterconditioned response in context B (cf. Bouton and Bolles,
1979; Bouton and Peck, 1989; Merchant et al., 2013). Fourth,
it has been observed that, under certain training conditions, a
learned contextual response can persist even though memory
for a conditioned stimulus (CS)/unconditioned stimulus (US)
association has been impaired through localized inhibition of
neurobiochemical processes crucial for the formation of long-
term memory (i.e., memory persisting at least 48 h) for CS/US
association (Runyan et al., 2004).
Extending from these animal studies, human studies have
revealed that context is similarly important in the learning of
habitual responses and automatic responses (e.g., Rydell and
Gawronski, 2009; Wood and Neal, 2009; Gawronski and Cesario,
2013). Additionally, there is evidence that contextual cues can
inﬂuence preparatory neural states associated with a certain
response and the likelihood an individual will respond in that
way in certain contexts (e.g., Deiber et al., 1996; Thoenissen
et al., 2002; Toni et al., 2002; Praamstra et al., 2009; Moisa et al.,
2012). In particular, addiction studies have shown that recovering
individual’s are more likely to relapse within contexts associated
with the addictive behavior (e.g., Crombag et al., 2008); and
this has been associated with plasticity in speciﬁc brain regions,
including the lateral hypothalamus (e.g., Marchant et al., 2009,
2014). Further, there is evidence indicating that the tendency to
give a habitual response becomes more stable and robust with
the repetition of the response in various contexts (e.g., Bouton,
2000; Neal et al., 2006, 2011). Taken together, these observations
provide evidence that, by promoting the development of habitual
responses or automatic responses within an individual’s daily
context, EMIs aimed at virtue development may be particularly
eﬀective. Given this, EMA data coupled with GPS data could
be used to trigger app-based EMIs in particular spatiotemporal
locations to promote the learning of habitual or automatic
responses in new, or various, contexts; especially in contexts
where an individual ﬁnds change diﬃcult (e.g., Watkins et al.,
2014).
One way that EMI might be eﬀective in promoting virtue
development is by prompting individuals to engage in practices,
or in training, aimed at developing a particular virtue (cf.
Magidson et al., 2014). Working memory training has been
shown to improve cognitive abilities and to result in neural
plasticity (e.g., Klingberg, 2010). There is some suggestion that
practicing gratitude increases dispositional gratitude (Emmons
and McCullough, 2003; Seligman et al., 2005). Additionally, self-
regulation exercises have been shown to improve self-regulation
(Baumeister et al., 2006; Cranwell et al., 2014). Further, in a
recent study, participants were given empathy and compassion
training (Klimecki et al., 2014; cf. Klimecki et al., 2012). After
empathy training, participants experienced increased negative
aﬀect associated with increased activity in the anterior insula
and the anterior midcingulate cortex (two regions previously
associated with empathy for pain) in response to watching
videos depicting human suﬀering. After compassion training,
these same individuals also experienced increased positive
aﬀect associated with increased activity in the ventral striatum,
pregenual anterior cingulate cortex and medial orbitofrontal
cortex (see Figure 4). The same eﬀects were not found in
controls who underwent memory training. The implication is
that training can result in increased empathy and compassion
as measured by aﬀective responses and associated brain activity
states.
App-based EMI may be a particularly eﬀective way of
administering dispositional training of the kindmentioned above
since smartphone app technology can support multifaceted,
interactive and progressive training within various contexts
throughout an individual’s daily routine. For instance, training
might involve prompting individuals to engage in app-delivered
activities or exercises, interact with app-based games, or with
videos or pictures, throughout the day. And training might get
more demanding over time.
Another way EMI might promote virtue development
is by speciﬁcally targeting mindfulness. According to the
predominating deﬁnition in psychology, mindfulness is
purposeful, non-evaluative awareness of one’s present
experiences and mental states moment-to-moment (Kabat-
Zinn, 2003; but see Brown and Ryan, 2003; Jankowski and
Holas, 2014). Not only is mindfulness thought by some to be
a virtue—and there is evidence that dispositional mindfulness
does promote mental health and resilience (e.g., Brown et al.,
2007)—there is some suggestion that mindfulness may help
promote the development of other virtues and, thus, provide
a case where virtues are interconnected. It is theorized that
mindfulness promotes positive change by promoting awareness
of one’s immediate experiences and states from a somewhat
detached state, which may, in turn, promote self-awareness
and self-regulation (Shapiro et al., 2006; Jankowski and Holas,
2014).
EMA observations support the theory that mindfulness
promotes self-regulation (e.g., Brown and Ryan, 2003).
Additionally, mindfulness training (involving attentional
ﬁxation on and nonjudgmental awareness of moment-to-
moment experiences) can improve working memory and
attention (Tang et al., 2007; Lutz et al., 2008; Jha et al., 2010;
MacLean et al., 2010). These improvements have been associated
with increased activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal
and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (Allen et al., 2012).
Mindfulness has also been observed to reduce interference
from emotionally salient distractors (Ortner et al., 2007),
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FIGURE 4 | Functional neural changes corresponding with
empathy training (red) and compassion training (blue) in
comparison to memory control as measured by fMRI (adapted
from Klimecki et al., 2014). Dashed lines represent regions
associated with empathy for pain in a recent meta-analysis by Lamm
et al. (2011). Numbers on the top row are the sagittal plane
coordinates. Numbers on the bottom row are the coronal plane
coordinates.
which has been associated with increased activity in the
medial prefrontal cortex and right anterior insula (Allen et al.,
2012).
App-based EMI approaches to virtue development might
prompt and remind individuals to engage in dynamic and
progressive mindfulness exercises within the context of daily
life. There are a number of mindfulness apps currently available
(Plaza et al., 2013). However, at present there has been little
work on the eﬀectiveness of app-based EMIs aimed at promoting
mindfulness (but see Chittaro and Vianello, 2014). Further, as
we will see toward the end of this section, there are a number
of parameters that are likely to inﬂuence whether EMIs are
eﬃcacious.
In addition to prompting various practices, trainings or
exercises within everyday contexts, eﬀective app-based EMIs for
virtue development might be designed by incorporating eﬀective
components of computer- and internet-based therapeutic
interventions (cf. Kaltenthaler et al., 2006; Barak et al., 2008;
Tillfors et al., 2008; Andersson, 2009; Bergström et al., 2010;
Newman et al., 2011; Andersson et al., 2013; Musiat and Tarrier,
2014). Web-based cognitive-behavioral therapy and guided self-
help interventions have been observed to be eﬃcacious in treating
eating disorders (Hötzel et al., 2013), insomnia (Holmqvist
et al., 2014), suicidal ideation, depressive symptoms, anxiety
(van Straten et al., 2008; March et al., 2009; Cuijpers et al.,
2013), posttraumatic stress disorder (Knaevelsrud and Maercker,
2007) and physical inactivity (van Stralen et al., 2009a,b, 2010,
2011). In multiple cases, these interventions have been observed
to facilitate long-term change (e.g., Knaevelsrud and Maercker,
2007; Litz et al., 2007; March et al., 2009; Ruwaard et al., 2010;
van Stralen et al., 2011; Cuijpers et al., 2013; Lappalainen et al.,
2014).
In these computer- and internet-based approaches:
(1) self-monitoring and self-awareness (e.g., Litz et al., 2007;
Morris et al., 2010),
(2) self-eﬃcacy and motivation (Litz et al., 2007; Turner et al.,
2007; Carlbring and Smit, 2008; Warmerdam et al., 2010;
Hötzel et al., 2013), and
(3) environmental awareness (van Stralen et al., 2009a)
are among the strongest mediators of enduring change. And, as
we will discuss in turn below, app-based EMI might be used to
eﬀectively promote each.
(1) As mentioned in the previous section, research from our
own lab shows that using an EMA/I app to ask individuals
questions about their responses at random times throughout
their daily activities can raise self-awareness (Runyan et al.,
2013). Additionally, app-based EMIs might allow individuals to
monitor summary data generated from their responses. Further,
by incorporating sensors, app-based EMI provides a means of
increasing self-awareness by increasing a person’s ability to self-
monitor. App-based EMIs that interface with mobile EEG (cf.
Curran and Stokes, 2003), physical activity sensors and/or other
physiological activity sensors (e.g., sensors for muscle tension,
temperature, galvanic skin response, blood pressure or heart-rate;
see Sutarto et al., 2010; Schwerdtfeger and Scheel, 2012; Bossman
et al., 2013; vonHaaren et al., 2013; Demarble et al., 2014; Dunton
et al., 2014) could provide biofeedback allowing an individual
to self-monitor to an extent otherwise impossible within close
spatial and temporal proximity to a focal event or state (cf.
Keedwell and Linden, 2013; Linden, 2014; Schoenberg andDavid,
2014). Feedback concerning preparatory neural activities, muscle
tension, blood pressure and/or heart rate (e.g., Koval et al., 2013)
within certain contexts might enable an individual to monitor
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patterns in their behaviors, thought life, states and/or experiences
of which they would otherwise be unaware.
(2) There is indication that self-monitoring promotes
self-regulation and positive behavioral development when
individuals have the opportunity and motivation to change (cf.
Bandura, 1991; Korotitsch and Nelson-Gray, 1999; Shiﬀman
et al., 2008; Quinn et al., 2010). Therefore, app-based EMIs
might eﬀectively promote positive change not only by providing
a means for self-monitoring but by also increasing motivation
through:
• repeatedly asking individuals directed questions;
• prompting goal-setting;
• pushing motivational statements, videos or pictures and
promoting positive self-talk to increase outcome expectancy
(i.e., belief that one’s eﬀorts will lead to the achievement of a
desirable end) and self-eﬃcacy (i.e., belief in one’s ability to
achieve one’s goal; Bandura, 1986, 1997);
• reminding individuals of their own intentions and values;
and/or
• intermittently giving individuals progress and
accomplishment reports (which has been shown to increase
motivation and promote positive behavioral development;
e.g., Korotitsch and Nelson-Gray, 1999; Kramer et al., 2014;
Mhurchu et al., 2014).
Also, a social component to app-based EMI, where individuals
can interact with others who are using the same EMI in order to
develop the same virtue, might also increase motivation as well as
self-eﬃcacy (cf. Obermayer et al., 2004; Przeworski and Newman,
2004; Hurling et al., 2007; Brendryen et al., 2008; Cafazzo et al.,
2012; King et al., 2013).
(3) With regard to increasing environmental awareness, app-
based EMIs that incorporate GPS (e.g., Yüce et al., 2012; Hollett
and Leander, 2013; Huang and Luo, 2014; Watkins et al., 2014),
and utilize smartphone microphones and cameras, might be
designed to notify individuals about aspects of their environment.
In this way, app-based EMIsmight be designed to raise awareness
of contextual/situational triggers for responses that the individual
desires to change as well as awareness of opportunities to respond
in ways that are expressions of a virtue. App-based EMIs might
also raise awareness of environmental resources and/or social
support that may help an individual in their eﬀort to change (e.g.,
van Stralen et al., 2009a; Mhurchu et al., 2014).
Whether EMI can eﬀectively promote virtue development—
and the optimal conditions for this development—remains to
be directly and systematically tested. In particular, it remains to
be seen whether EMIs, including app-based EMIs, can promote
long-term dispositional development that persists following the
termination of the intervention. Relevant parameters of EMI in
need of testing are:
(i) duration of intervention;
(ii) frequency of interactions;
(iii) duration of each interaction;
(iv) whether interactions occur at varied or ﬁxed times;
(v) whether, and the degree to which, the intervention is
intermittent or continuous over a period of time;
(vi) degree of variation or repetition between interactions;
(vii) how broadly or narrowly the intervention is focused
(e.g., number of responses targeted, types of interactions
provided);
(viii) whether the intervention is individualized/tailored;
(ix) whether the intervention progresses over time (e.g., involves
scaﬀolding);
(x) whether the intervention involves social interaction; and
(xi) the degree to which the intervention is engaging (e.g.,
interesting, meaningful and/or fun).
Given EMI can promote virtue development, optimal conditions
are likely to depend somewhat on the virtue. Nevertheless,
there are also likely to be some common optimal conditions.
We hypothesize that these optimal conditions will, to a
certain degree, track those for instrumental learning whereby
intentionally modiﬁed responses in early stages of learning are
cued by stimuli as expressions of a habitual response or automatic
response in later stages (e.g., Dickinson et al., 1995; Schachtman
and Reilly, 2011). In this case, EMIs that maintain the highest
levels of engagement, motivation and awareness of opportunities
to respond or otherwise behave in ways that are expressions of
a virtue, over the longest period of time, are likely to be the
most eﬀective (e.g., Rescorla and Solomon, 1967; Sutherland and
Mackintoch, 1971; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Bandura, 1977).
This is likely to be accomplished by EMIs that:
1. focus on one virtue at a time (cf. Kamin, 1968; Rescorla and
Wagner, 1972);
2. progress and involve scaﬀolding (cf. Salomon, 1993; Pea,
2004);
3. are tailored to the individual and incorporate the individual’s
judgments, values and aims (cf. Levey and Martin, 1975;
Shanks and Dickinson, 1991; Kreuter et al., 2000a,b; Strecher
et al., 2005);
4. involve social interaction amongst individuals with similar
aims (cf. Bandura, 1977, 1986, 1997); and
5. interact with individuals at varied, rather than ﬁxed, intervals
and provide positive reinforcement for virtue development
(e.g., make virtue development, and interaction with the
intervention, varied, interesting, meaningful and/or fun).
Scheduling intermittent EMAs as an individual uses an EMI
aimed at promoting virtue development provides a way of
assessing and optimizing the eﬃcacy of EMI in real-time (cf.
Voogt et al., 2013). As we have already discussed, EMA can be
used to assess virtue expression, and/or detect correlates of this
expression. And a smartphone app can be used to administer
both EMA and EMI.
Conclusions
There seems to be conclusive reasons for thinking that some
people possess virtues understood as relatively stable and robust
psychological dispositions that contribute to a deeply fulﬁlling,
well-lived life of growth (i.e., a ﬂourishing life)—and situational
studies have not presented reasons for thinking otherwise.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 15 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481
Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones
Further, since knowledge of what contributes to ﬂourishing
is worth seeking, virtues are worth studying. As a result
of the widespread use of smartphones and advancements in
smartphone technology, app-based EMA provides a new means
for examining the stability, robustness and interconnectedness
of virtues, and the physiological (including neurophysiological)
correlates of having and/or expressing virtues. In short, app-
based EMA provides a wholistic approach to examining the
extent to which virtues are possessed as well as the personal,
physiological and biochemical characteristics of individuals
who possess and express virtues, which promises to provide
new insight. Additionally, app-based EMI provides a new and
powerful vehicle for promoting the development of virtues where
virtues should be expressed—within the context of our daily lives.
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